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Abstract. Employers and job seekers rely extensively on job informa-
tional networks to ll vacancies or to nd a job. The widespread use
of job contacts to nd work has been largely associated with labor out-
comes, such as nding a job or even aecting wages. Some scholars
have claimed that informal referrals play a determinant role in reducing
informational mismatches between potential employers and job seekers.
Although several studies have shown that the use of friends and relatives
is correlated with labor outcomes, little is known about the causal ef-
fect. In this article, I aim to identify whether there is a causal eect of
using informal referrals on two main outcomes: the probability of being
employed and hourly wages. I use a large data set from Colombia, the
Living Standard Survey 2003, to contrast the results from three main
methodologies: standard OLS estimation, propensity-score matching,
and instrumental variables. Results suggest that much of the positive
eect of using informal referrals on employment re
ects the prevalence
of informal-sector jobs to be lled through this method rather than a
causal eect. On the contrary, the results for hourly wages suggest a
negative causal eect of using job informational networks, which is ex-
plained by the low-quality/poor matches theory. Yet, this is only true in
formal-sector rms.
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Employers and job seekers are brought together through their recruitment and job
search strategies. These strategies are classied as either formal or informal. The for-
mal mechanism operates via media advertisements, and public or private intermediary
agencies. Informal methods rely on information from personal intermediaries such as
friends, relatives, or acquaintances.
The recent literature has investigated the relationship between job search strategies
and labor outcomes. Specically, a large amount of literature analyzes the eect of
using informal referrals on labor outcomes.
1 Section 2 reviews this literature focus-
ing on those studies that provide a theoretical framework of the mechanism through
which the job search strategy aects both employment opportunities and wages; in
this section I also survey the latest empirical studies. The main lesson from this lit-
erature is that informal search methods are widely used. Depending on the country,
informal referrals are typically estimated to account for somewhere between 25 to 70
percent of hires (Calv o-Armengol & Jackson, 2004; Montgomery, 1991). The litera-
ture also acknowledges that friends, relatives, and acquaintances play a major role in
solving information asymmetries and other frictions in the labor market and, hence,
potentially aect labor outcomes. But, unfortunately, there is no consensus about the
channel through which informal referrals operate to aect labor outcomes, particularly
wages. Greater discrepancies are evident in the empirical literature. Indeed, sampling
limitation, methodologies, and measurement problems make it dicult to draw rm
conclusions about the extent to which there is a causal relationship between the use of
informal referrals and labor outcomes.
In this article, I address several empirical questions concerning the causal link between
job search choices and both the probability of being employed and wages, using the
Living Standard Survey (LSS) for 2003, a national representative household survey in
Colombia.
2 A preliminary data analysis of the LSS survey, Section 3, conrms that
informal referrals are often used: around 40 percent of job seekers rely on this method
to nd a job, and roughly 70 percent of salaried workers report that they were hired
through informal referrals. Moreover, a naive comparison of average outcomes shows
signicant dierences between referred and non referred workers. There is a 21.4 per-
centage point dierence between the employment rate of informal referral users (88.2
1 For recent surveys refer to Ioannides & Loury (2004); Marsden & Gorman (2001)
2 One should expect that agents seek for employment through informal channels whenever formal channels work poorly
or are inexistent. Colombia seems to t this description since there is not a centralized unemployment system, the only
state employment agency performs badly and private employment agencies are limited.
1percent) versus non-users (66.7 percent). Additionally, referred workers earn on aver-
age 44 percent less than non-referred workers. These comparisons are very likely to
be biased if there exist both observed and unobserved attributes that jointly aect the
decision of using informal channels and outcome variables. Such process is known as
selectivity bias, which is a result of individual self-sorting, selection made by the em-
ployer, or both. For example, job seekers sort into job search strategies based on their
own attributes (age, education, gender, and social abilities), which might be precisely
the attributes that employers value in their selection and wage-setting processes. The
measured referred/non-referred dierentials, therefore, might simply re
ect the eect
of these attributes.
This paper contributes to the literature by attempting to identify causal eects of the
use of informal referrals on both the probability of being employed and hourly wages,
while explicitly taking into account the potential selectivity bias. Section 4 reviews
the main empirical strategies that I use to circumvent this bias. I focus on three
widely used econometric methods: ordinary least squares, propensity-score matching,
and instrumental variables. The rst two methods address the selectivity bias based
on observable individual attributes. The last recognizes the presence of unobserved
variables that aect both the use of informal referrals and the probability of being
employed, even after conditioning on observed variables. It requires, however, the choice
of an adequate instrument. I propose a variable that proxies for the use of informal
referrals within the household, which is a binary variable equal to one if the closest
blood relative in the household obtained his current job through informal referrals.
This instrument conveys information about potential household correlation of the use
of informal referrals, as well as potential channels of job related information. Thus,
we can argue that it is highly correlated with the use of informal referrals and that
its only correlation with both employment status and hourly wages is through the
use of informal referrals. Yet, to avoid any remaining eect between the instrument
and unobserved factors aecting the outcome it is necessary to control for observed
attributes that might be correlated at the household level; in this case I control for
employment attributes of the closest relative.
Section 5 presents and discusses the results of implementing these methodologies. In
general terms, the results suggest that, after controlling for unobserved attributes, in-
formal referrals are not more successful than any other job search strategy in terms
of job seekers' placement. In other words, the employment rate dierential between
referred and non-referred workers is not signicantly dierent from zero. I argue that
2much of the initial positive eect of using informal referrals is due to dierences in the
observed characteristics and selection eects.
On the contrary, the results suggest that informal referrals usage has a negative eect on
hourly wages after controlling for all potential confounding variables (i.e., observed and
unobserved variables). This nding is robust to minor variations of the control variables,
and variations of the methodologies. Is important to clarify that I use the sub-sample
of salaried workers to calculate the estimates, and the estimation procedures used in
this section do not control for self-selection into employment. To explore whether this
process biases the results I estimate the parameters from a two-stage Heckman model,
and there is no evidence that the failure to control for self-selection yields biased results
in this case. The point estimates suggest that referred workers earn on average 13
percent less than non referred workers.
This nding can be interpreted in at least two ways. One interpretation is that the use
of informal referrals generates a mismatch between a worker's occupation choice and his
comparative productive advantage because informal referrals induce both the average
quality of the labor force and the return to rms' investment to remain low (Bentolila
et al. , 2004). Thus, jobs found through contacts are obtained more quickly but also
pay lower wages, since at least some of them are lled by workers who sacrice their
productive advantage in order to get a job more easily. An alternative interpretation
is that informal referrals are proxying for unobserved job attributes. For example, jobs
reachable through social networks are available only in rms that pay lower wages,
regardless of skills. In Colombia, this is particularly the case of informal-sector rms
where neither hiring nor minimum-wage laws are enforceable. Thus, the negative eect
of informal referrals on wages might simply re
ect that workers in the informal sector
earn less than workers in the formal sector. If this is true and there is some aspect of
informal sector jobs that is not adequately controlled for by observed variables, then
the true eect of using job contacts may be biased downwards.
One way to try to get around this problem is to carry out a model known in the
literature as the Roy model, which consists of two wage equations (one for each sector)
and a selection equation that determines the sector in which the employee is working.
The model supports the idea that referred workers have a higher probability of working
in the informal sector, but within this sector there is no signicant wage gap between
referred and non referred workers. On the contrary, there is a wage discount of around
13 percent for jobs found through contacts in the formal sector. This result supports the
theory that informal referrals tend to distort workers' occupational choices, inducing
low quality matches. Yet, this is only true for formal-sector occupations.
32. Literature Review
In this section I use several recent review articles to divide the analysis into two main
categories: the eect of informal referrals on employment, and their eect on wages. In
each subsection, I rst delineate the theoretical approaches and subsequently discuss
the empirical ndings.
Employment. Authors often link the use of informal referrals and labor market ad-
vantages by asserting that social networks reduce information asymmetries between job
seekers and potential employers, and that they constitute a low-cost job search method
(Montgomery, 1991; Mortensen & Vishwanath, 1994; Holzer, 1987b). Although job-
related information can be acquired through formal methods, it can be obtained more
rapidly through social networks (Aguilera, 2002). Moreover, in labor markets under-
mined by various sorts of frictions and long spells of unemployment, job seekers may
use informal referrals in order to locate vacancies without bearing high search costs
(Holzer, 1987a; Calv o-Armengol & Jackson, 2004; Fontaine, 2004). On the other hand,
job seekers not using social networks may miss job opportunities only available through
personal networks. For example, Montgomery (1991) shows that employers often del-
egate the screening function of nding the most suitable employees to the network of
their current workforce because they are more likely to refer workers of the same type.
Applicants outside the network do not learn about such jobs. Under these conjectures,
one can argue that referred workers are in an advantageous position in the job nding
process.
Recent studies have shown that the benets from using informal referrals in the job
search process cannot be generalized, since their usage might aect particular subgroups
more than others (Calv o-Armengol & Zenou, 2005; Calv o-Armengol & Jackson, 2006;
Ioannides & Loury, 2004). Their benets might be shaped by institutional, employer,
network, and worker heterogeneity. For instance, the institutional background might
determine the conditions under which job search methods operate (Fontaine, 2004).
Employer heterogeneity denotes the fact that some sectors, professions, and rms are
more prone to rely on job informational networks to ll their vacancies (Corcoran et al.
, 1980b; Holzer, 1987b; Marsden & Gorman, 2001). Network heterogeneity denote vari-
ations in the resource endowment of workers' contacts and also the relationship with
the contact that might aect the transmission of job information (Calv o-Armengol &
Jackson, 2004; Mortensen & Vishwanath, 1994; Lin, 2001; Ioannides & Loury, 2004).
3
3 The size of the network might play a relevant role since more social links lead to a more 
uent transmission of
information about employment opportunities (Granovetter, 1973; Calv o-Armengol, 2004). Aside from the size, the
literature recognizes that the transmission of job information is aected by the quality of the network (Calv o-Armengol
& Jackson, 2004; Mortensen & Vishwanath, 1994; Lin, 2001).
4Finally, worker heterogeneity refers to dierences in worker productivity or other rele-
vant individual employability attributes. It interacts with all four of the other areas in
determining access to contacts and employers (Ioannides & Loury, 2004).
Empirical analyses suggest that social networks do aect the eventual assignment of
workers to jobs. Although it is not the particular interest of this paper, it is important
to note that most of the empirical literature has evaluated the eect of informal referrals
on unemployment duration. There is a general agreement in this literature that informal
job search methods are associated with shorter unemployment duration and increased
likelihood of exit when compared to formal job search methods (Montgomery, 1991;
Blau & Robins, 1990; Korpi, 2001; Osberg, 1993). The few empirical papers examining
the relationship between job search methods and employment pertain to specic groups,
such as immigrants, blacks, women, or youths. Their results indicate an important
variation in the relationship between informal referrals and employment across groups
(Yakubovich, 2005; Bortnick & Ports, 1992; Alon & Stier, 2004; Chapple, 2002; Bian,
1997; Amuedo-Dorantes & Mundra, 2005; Borghans et al. , 2006; Goos & Salomons,
2007; Aguilera, 2002). For example, Bortnick & Ports (1992), using US data, nd that
men who were unemployed in a given month in 1991, and who used informal referrals
that month, were slightly more likely than their female counterparts to nd a job a
month later. They also nd racial dierences, since whites were more likely to be
employed a month later if they used help from friends and relatives than their black
counterparts. Alon & Stier (2004); Chapple (2002); Borghans et al. (2006); Goos &
Salomons (2007), using both dierent data and methods, conrm these results.
These empirical analyses are usually based on observational data and do not explicitly
take into account the possible selectivity bias. One should be careful, therefore, to
interpret these results as causal eects. For example, the fact that unrepresented groups
(e.g., females, blacks, immigrants) are less likely to nd a job when using informal
referrals than their counterparts (e.g., males, whites, non migrants) might simply re
ect
that those groups are less likely to be employed regardless of which job search method
they have used, and the estimates might simply be an artifact of the selectivity bias.
Wages. Diverse theoretical foundations provide varying (and sometimes con
icting)
links between the job search method and the resulting wage. Evidently, empirical
research trying to test such foundations also provides con
icting results. Here, I provide
a review of relevant theoretical literature to be followed by a brief review of the main
empirical ndings.
5Some researchers argue that the use of informal referrals in the job search process leads
to higher wages. This literature states that although the use of informal referrals does
not directly aect worker's productivity, it could improve the quality of the job match
since both potential employers and job seekers have access to better and more reliable
sources of information (Montgomery, 1991; Mortensen & Vishwanath, 1994; Simon &
Warner, 1992). Employers can exploit information 
owing within social networks to
screen their potential applicants, and potential employees also have access to valuable
information about non-pecuniary aspects of employment and, hence, might nd jobs
more closely matching their skills and preferences (Fernandez & Castilla, 2001). An-
other possible explanation for the referral wage premium is that employed contacts
are more prone to refer only good applicants because their reputation is at stake and,
therefore, less able workers will nd it more dicult to get a reference in the rst place
(Kugler, 2003). For the same reason, high-eort referees can exert peer pressure on
coworkers once they are hired, thus making them more productive. Yet, positive eects
might also arise due to simple correlation induced by nepotism or favoritism instead
of eects on workers' productivity. For example, Lin (2001) shows that employed con-
tacts of unemployed workers may also directly in
uence the job-matching process by
providing entry into highly paid jobs regardless of their qualications. In the same
way, Goldberg (1982) asserts that less competitive industries may be able to aord
maximizing utility instead of prots and pay wage premiums to referred applicants.
In contrast to these views, some theories postulate that there is a negative relationship
between the use of informal referrals and wages. This literature claims that job seekers
are willing to sacrice higher wages to obtain a position rapidly. For example, Bentolila
et al. (2004) emphasize that job contacts may produce a mismatch between workers'
comparative productive advantage and their occupational choices. Such conjecture
implies that informal referrals create poor matches: the availability of informal referrals
and the opportunity to nd a job more easily may induce a job seeker to accept a job
oer in professions, sectors, or locations where his abilities are not fully exploited. They
show that people using social contacts have on average lower abilities and, therefore,
would earn less than individuals who used other methods. However, the literature
also argues that this negative eect can stem from unobserved attributes of either the
worker or the job. For example, Granovetter (1995) argues that workers who rely on
contacts are likely to be the ones who are in greater need of a job, and thus, they are
likely to accept lower wages. So, the use of informal referrals can be a negative signal
for employers who can respond by oering a lower wage. Additionally, rm attributes
might also matter since jobs reachable through social networks are usually available
6in rms which pay lower wages (Labini, 2004). We can therefore summarize these
two theories into causal and correlated eects. The causal eect argues that informal
referrals result in a mismatch between a worker's productive comparative advantage
and his occupational choices (induced by social ties), which in turn might aect the
worker's productivity. On the other hand, the correlated eect argues that individuals
who rely on informal referrals are more likely to earn lower wages because they are
low ability individuals regardless of the job search method used, or because they are
employed in rms that strongly rely on informal referrals to ll their vacancies but also
pay lower wages.
Limited by the particular theory, methodology, and related variables chosen for anal-
ysis, the empirical literature often provides support to opposing theories. Empirical
results from job information networks support a positive relationship between the use
of informal referrals in the job search process and accepted wages. Granovetter (1973),
Corcoran et al. (1980b), Simon & Warner (1992), Rosenbaum et al. (1999), Marmaros
& Sacerdote (2002), Green et al. (1999), and Kugler (2003) nd a positive wage pre-
mium for jobs obtained through referrals from current employees. However, empirical
support for signicant positive eects is not universal. Elliot (1999), Datcher Loury
(2006), Bentolila et al. (2004), and Pellizzari (2004) report a negative relationship be-
tween social networks and wages. Finally, Bridges & Villemez (1986) and Mouw (2003)
claim that the use of friends and relatives in the job search process does not have any
eect on wages.
The absence of experimental data makes us cautious about interpreting these results
when it comes to distinguishing between causality and correlation. For example, a pos-
itive wage gap between referred workers and non referred workers might result from
good-quality matches which improve worker productivity. On the contrary, a negative
wage gap between referred and non referred workers might result in low/poor-quality
matches which will deteriorate worker productivity. These two cases can be under-
stood as causal eects. It turns out, however, that those who do not use informal
referrals are also more likely to have specic individual attributes that directly aect
their performance and, therefore, their wages; it is the worker's skills that are play-
ing a signicant role in their performance and wages. Moreover, the informal referrals
variable might be proxying for unobserved job attributes. For example, jobs where
informal networks work eectively (in the sense of successfully matching job seekers to
jobs) may be available only at rms that pay lower wages on average irrespectively of
their workers' abilities. Concerns over such sources of bias on estimates of returns to
education have resulted in a large literature in economics that attempts to identify the
7causal eect of education on wages and income (see the extensive review in Card (1999)
and Blundell et al. (2005)). However, the empirical literature on social networks has
failed to control for the presence of this bias. One exception is the paper of Mouw
(2003), where he replicates several empirical analyses for the US using a xed-eects
model to dierence out xed unobserved individual attributes, and he concludes that
there is no evidence to argue that using contacts causally aects wages.
3. Data Description














Primary or Less 14.89% 14.82%
Secondary 44.24% 43.15%
Higher Educ non Univ. 11.29% 11.83%
Uncomplete University 10.40% 10.11%
Complete University 11.79 % 12.57%
Post University 7.18% 7.53%
Age Range
15 - 24 21.11% 19.14%
25 - 34 31.39% 34.09%
35 - 44 24.64% 27.48%
45 - 54 14.48% 15.37%





Unipersonal Household 4.65% 4.80%
Presence Child 0 - 4 14.34% 15.77%
Presence Child 4 - 6 13.51% 14.78%
Presence Child 7 - 12 25.83% 27.02%
Closest relative employed 57.11% 55.82%
Instrument




NOTE: Standard Deviation in Brackets, Self-employed also includes
non paid workers. * SE accounts for Self employed workers. ** Mean
of Hourly wages corresponds to 2,643 pesos which represents US$0.95
(exchange rate 2.778 pesos/US dollar in 2003)
The empirical analysis is based on
Colombian data from the Living Stan-
dards Survey (LSS) of 2003, a nationally
representative household survey carried
out on a sample of 22,090 households,
from which 82,495 individuals were in-
terviewed (see Appendix A for a more
detailed description of the survey)
4. The
particular sample used in this analysis
is restricted to the labor force living in
urban areas, which corresponds to 22%
of the aggregate sample. It also ex-
cludes self employed and non-paid work-
ers since they do not report their job
search strategies.
Table 1 presents some relevant gures of
these data. Around 80 percent of the
labor force is employed, and earns on
average almost one US dollar per hour.
The Table also reports descriptive sta-
tistics for the labor force, and separately
for salaried workers, and depicts the dis-
tribution of each sample by relevant ob-
served characteristics used in the empir-
ical analysis. On the basis of the gures,
one can deduce that the composition of
4 The gures and results depicted in this section were contrasted with the Continuum Household Survey for 2002, 2003,
and 2004. The results, available upon request, are similar to those reported in this section.
8the population by both individual and household attributes does not vary across sam-
ples. The only relevant distinction is that the salaried sample has a larger fraction
of males and middle aged individuals than the active population sample. In sum, the
samples are mainly composed of males, with secondary education, who are middle aged,
white and non-single.
The Treatment Variable. The LSS collects information regarding the main job
search method for both unemployed and salaried workers. The survey asks unemployed
workers: \What was your main activity in the last four weeks to nd a job?". For
salaried workers, the question is: \How did you nd your current job?". Both salaried
and unemployed can select among one of the following eight channels: i. ask for help
from relatives, friends or ex-colleagues, ii. from the governmental center for employment
information, iii. direct application, iv. visit private agencies, v. by publishing adverts
in newspapers, vi. public announcements, vii. Internet, and xiii. tried to establish your
own business.
Table 2. Job Search Methods, Percentage by Em-
ployment Status, LSS 2003.
Method Unemployed Salaried
Informal Referrals 39.32% 69.30%
Direct Applications 35.35% 13.81%
Government 2.22% 0.90%





Source: Own's calculations from LSS 2003
Table 2 compares the response distribution for
the unemployed and the employed groups. Al-
though both of them rely on informal contacts
to search for a job, the proportions vary con-
siderably across groups. Seventy percent of
salaried workers report that they were hired
using help from contacts, while only forty per-
cent of unemployed focus their job search pro-
cess on this method.
Using these data I dene a binary variable that describes the use of informal referrals,
which I name IR. It takes the value of one in two situations: i. if the individual is
unemployed and declares informal referrals as his main strategy to nd a job, or ii. if
the person is employed and states that he has found his current job through informal
referrals. The IR variable takes the value of zero if the individual is either unemployed
or employed and declares the use of other channels to nd his job.
A major disadvantage of the LSS survey is the lack of information on whether the
individual is seeking for a job through dierent channels simultaneously. Individuals
do not necessarily focus their search on a single channel, but rather are more likely to
diversify their search in order to increase the probability of obtaining a job. Ideally,
one would prefer to analyze both the use of informal referrals as a single job search
9method and mixed strategies of using a combination of job-search methods. Lacking
this information, I restrict the analysis to the main channel.
5
Table 3. Labor Market Outcomes by Job Search
Method, LSS 2003.
Outcome IR user IR non Dierence
user
(1) (2) (1-2)
Employment Rate 88.15% 66.69% 21.46pp
S.E. [0.30%] [0.56%] [0.59]
Hourly Wages (log) 7.74 8.18 43.78%
S.E. [.013] [.008] [0.015]
Source: Own's calculations from LSS 2003
To conclude this section, I describe the ob-
served dierence in both outcomes by job
search channel. Table 3 reports the average
for both employment and hourly wage by job
search method, as well as, the naive dierence
between them. It can be seen that informal
referral users have a higher employment rate
than non users (a dierence of 21 percentage points). On the contrary, referred workers
earn on average 44 percent less than non referred workers.
4. Empirical Methodology
This section describes the methodologies used in the empirical analysis. It uses the coun-
terfactual approach widely used in the microeconometric literature (Heckman et al. ,
1997; Heckman, 1997; Heckman et al. , 1998; Imbens & Angrist, 1994) to initially de-
scribe the fundamental estimation problem, and to subsequently discuss the identifying
assumptions of each econometric strategy. It then brie
y delineates how these strategies
are implemented to yield practical estimators.
To illustrate the problem, let informal referral usage be described by a binary variable
IRi = f0;1g. For notational simplicity, let us assume that both outcomes of interest
(employment status and hourly wages) are denoted by yi. Hence, for each individual
there are two potential outcomes: i. the outcome if he uses IR, yi1, and ii. the outcome
if he uses other methods, yi0. We would like to know the dierence between yi1 and yi0,
which can be said to be a causal eect of using informal referrals for each individual,
i.e., 
i = yi1   yi0. However, only one of the potential outcomes is observed for each
individual. Consequently, estimating the individual treatment eect 
i is not feasible
and one has to concentrate on average treatment eects by comparing IR users to a
similar group of individuals who did not use this channel to obtain their job. Here, I
focus on the widely used average treatment eect on the sub-population that uses help
from friends and relatives, known as the average treatment eect on the treated (ATT),
i.e., E[
ijIRi = 1].
5 Another minor disadvantage is that the LSS does not include information regarding individual attributes of the contact.
I cannot, therefore, evaluate whether the \quality" or social attributes of the contact aect labor outcomes. I instead
argue that the primary advantage of contacts is to provide information about job openings, and such information will
be useful despite the attributes of the person who provides it.
10A naive comparison of observed outcomes between IR users and non IR users, shown
in Section 3, provides us with the ATT plus a bias term:
E[yijIRi = 1]   E[yijIRi = 0]
| {z }
Outcome's Observed Dierence




+E[yi0jIRi = 1]   E[yi0jIR1 = 0]
| {z }
Selection Bias
Indeed, the selection bias arises because the counterfactual, E[y0ijIRi = 1], is not
observable and any inference from observational data might yield biased estimates. For
example, if individuals with favorable labor market attributes were more likely to have
chosen informal referrals as their main channel to seek employment, it is likely that IR
users would have done better on average than non IR users, regardless of which job
search method they used. If so, the last term of the right hand side is positive and a
naive comparison exaggerates the benets of using informal referrals.
Many schemes have been proposed to circumvent this bias. Here I focus on three widely
employed methods: standard regression methods, propensity-score matching, and in-
strumental variables. Although these methodologies try to address the plausible bias,
each approach invokes dierent identifying assumptions to construct the required coun-
terfactual outcome. I begin by considering both ordinary least squares and propensity
score matching, which are based on the selection on observables assumption. Follow-
ing that, I describe the instrumental variable methodology that allows for selection on
unobservables.
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) identies the causal eects, 
ATT, under the as-
sumption that after controlling for observable characteristics, Xi, IR and the potential
employment status are independent. This assumption is known in the literature as
the conditional independence assumption (CIA), and it implies that if one can control
for observable dierences in individual attributes between IR users and non IR users,
the outcome that would result without treatment is the same in both cases. In other
words, the counterfactual equals the observed outcome for IR users, conditional on Xi,
i.e., E[yi0jXi;IRi = 1] = E[yi0jXi;IRi = 0].6 Given this condition, the ATT can be
constructed by iterating expectations over Xi,


OLS = E [E[yijXi;IRi = 1]   E[yijXi;IRi = 0]]





6 Rosenbaum & Rubin (1983) and numerous predecessors describe this assumption as yi1;yi0 ? IRijXi. Heckman et al.
(1997) argue that for identication of ATT a weaker condition is required, namely y0i?IRjX. The only assumption that
is required is the conditional mean independence assumption: E[yi0jXi;IRi = 1] = E[yi0jXi;IRi = 0] = E[yi0jXi]. It
implies that yi0 does not determine the use of informal referrals.
11OLS identies the average treatment eect on the treated (ATT), under the assumption
that the observed attributes, Xi, are the only reason why potential outcomes dier by
job search channel. Therefore, controlling for them makes the selection bias disappear.
Propensity Score Matching (PSM) also assumes that the selection bias can be
expressed purely in terms of observable characteristics. Similar to OLS, it uses observed
explanatory variables to adjust for dierences in the employment status unrelated to
the use of informal referrals that give rise to selection bias. Therefore, for identication
of causal eects, this method also relies on the conditional independence assumption
(CIA).
Matching consists of nding a set of non-treated observations with the same realization
of Xi for each IR user. A practical implementation problem arises when the vector
Xi is highly dimensional. To circumvent this diculty, Rosenbaum & Rubin (1983)
show that matching on a scalar function of Xi, such as the propensity score, P(X) =
Pr(IRi = 1jXi)),7 is sucient to balance the covariates Xi between the IR users and
control units. Thus, if CIA holds conditional on Xi, it will also hold conditional on the
propensity score, i.e., (yi1;yi0) ? IRijP(Xi). In order to ensure that CIA has empirical
content, matching requires the existence of users and non users for each variable we seek
to compare, i.e., 0 < P(IRi = 1jXi) < 1. This assumption is known in the literature










Although OLS and PSM rely on the CIA assumption, they dier in two main aspects.
First, matching, by construction, eliminates the bias from having dierent ranges of Xi
for the samples of IR users and non IR users (comparing non-comparable individuals,
failure of the common support assumption) and the bias resulting from having dierent
distributions of Xi across their common support (Heckman et al. , 1999). Second,
matching is non-parametric, thus it avoids the restrictions involved in models that
require the relationship between characteristics and outcomes to be specied.
7 The conditional probability of using informal referrals given the vector of observed covariates.
8 Failure to satisfy this assumption restricts the analysis to the region of support (all possible values of Xi) common to
all IR users and non IR users, and the estimated treatment eect has to be redened as the mean treatment eect for
those treated falling within the common support region.











. N1 is the number of IR
users and N0 is the number of non IR users, WN0 is a weight function that weights the observations of an IR non-user
according to their similarity with the observed covariates of the IR user. In this case I use Kernel Matching, where IR
users are matched with a weighted average of all controls using weights that are inversely proportional to the distance
between the propensity scores of IR users and non IR users (Becker & Ichino, 2002; Todd, 2006).
12PSM and OLS estimates assume that, conditional on the individual attributes that
employers use to select their employees and to set wages, the use of informal referrals
is independent of potential outcomes. The motivation to use these strategies is the
assumption that employers screen applicants and set wages primarily on the basis of
observable covariates like age, schooling, gender, and race. Thus, after controlling for
all these attributes, IR users and non-users are comparable. This assumption holds,
however, if and only if there is no omitted variable bias once Xi is included in the
regression; in other words, it will hold if there are no unobserved characteristics that
in
uence the use of informal referrals which are also associated with the outcomes. This
assumption, however, cannot be formally tested. Instead, I will compare the estimated
results from both methodologies with those obtained by instrumental variables.
Instrumental Variables recognizes that workers who use informal referrals are likely
to be non-randomly selected, even conditioning on observed attributes. Heckman (1997)
describes this method as a variant of the method of matching, since it augments the X
variables in matching with instruments Z. Such instruments must satisfy the following
conditions: i. the use of informal referrals depends in a non-trivial way on both Xi and
Z (i.e., E[IRijXiy;Zi] 6= E[IRi]), and ii. the instrument does not have any direct impact
on individual employment status, conditional on the observed individual attributes (i.e.,
E[yi0jXi;Zi] = E[yi0jX]).
Here, the variable used to instrument for the use of informal referrals is a proxy of their
usage within the household. It is a binary variable, Zi = f0;1g, that indicates whether
the closest blood relative within the household obtained his current job using informal
referrals. From Boorman (1975) and Calv o-Armengol (2004) we can assume that the
way in which the job related information 
ows within the network is the following: if an
employed individual hears about a job opening, and it is not interesting for himself, he
passes it on to his closest relative. Therefore, the instrument conveys information about
potential household correlation on the use of informal referrals, as well as on potential
channels of job related information. However, it does not contain information about
individual-specic chances to nd a job resulting from unobservable characteristics such
as social skills, and should therefore be uncorrelated with unobserved employment com-
ponents. Under this assumption one might justify that the instrument can only aect
the employment situation through the use of informal referrals.
A skeptical reader can nd reason to doubt the validity of this instrument since Z
itself is endogenous and confounded with IR and yi. The use of informal referrals at
the household level might induce some individuals to also use this method, but it is
unlikely to aect both employment and wages directly. Nevertheless, the instrument
13is not randomly assigned but chosen by the closest relative in the household. Their
choice, however, might itself be related to characteristics that directly aect their closest
relative's subsequent employment status and wages. It is therefore necessary to control
for these confounding covariates, XCR, to handle the endogeneity of the instrumental
variable Z. In this particular case, I include employment attributes of the closest relative
such as rm size, position, sector, and whether he is a white collar worker.
In this framework, the engine that drives causal inference is the instrument Zi = f0;1g,
but the variable of interest is still IRi. Thus, the dependence of the employment status
on the instrument arises through the dependence of IR on Zi as follows,
E[yijZi = z] = E[yi0jZ = z] + E[yi1   yi0]E[IRijZ = z]
Given that there are two possible realizations of Z, we can condition not only on
the same set of observed attributes employed in OLS and PSM, Xy, but also on the
employment attributes of the closest relative, XCR, to distinguish two expectations





E[yijXyi;XCR;Zi = 1]   E[yijXyi;XCR;Zi = 0]
E[IRi = 1jXyi;XCR;Zi = 1]   E[IRi = 1jXyi;XCR;Zi = 0]
Under the assumption that Zi has a clear eect on IRi and that the only reason for
the relationship between the employment status and the instrument is the rst stage
(once we control for the employment attributes of the closest relative), 2SLS identies
the causal eect of the use of informal referrals on both labor outcomes, whenever the
selection is on unobservables. 10 11
In sum, each methodology aims to identify causal eects while explicitly taking into
account the potential selectivity bias that might arise from individual self-sorting, selec-
tion made by the employer, or both. OLS and PSM assume that there are no important
variables apart from Xi on which we cannot condition, that aect both the non-users
employment status, yi0, and the use of informal referrals, IRi. If this assumption does
not hold, the selection would be on unobservables and IV is called for, where identica-
tion of causal eects is achieved through Z conditional on the employment attributes
of the closest relative.
10 In the case of employment I obtain consistent estimates by carrying out OLS in both stages. As Angrist (2001) argues,
conventional 2SLS estimates using a linear probability model are consistent whether or not the rst stage conditional
expectation function is linear.
11 As Imbens & Angrist (1994) have shown, the standard interpretation of this estimator applies only when the treatment
eect is constant among the treated. In the more realistic case of heterogeneous causal eects, and under a set of
additional assumptions (i. stable unit treatment values (SUTVA), ii. ignorable assignment to treatment, and iii.
monotonicity.), IV estimates the average treatment eect among those who modify the job search channel because the
closest member did it; they call this parameter the local average treatment eect (LATE).
145. Empirical Results
This section presents some evidence on the empirical eect of informal referrals on both
labor outcomes: the probability of being employed and hourly wages. Given that each
outcome has its owns specicities, I analyze them separately. I explore the sensitivity
of the point estimates to the exclusion of the closest relative's employment attributes,
XCR, by comparing two main specications. I also examine whether the use of informal
referrals aects particular subgroups more than others.
Employment. The rst relevant outcome is the employment status of the active pop-
ulation, a binary variable equal to one if individual i is employed in the reference week.
The treatment variable, IR, represents contact usage as the main method to seek for
employment. Initially, in Specication 1 I control for the set of variables that directly
aect both the probability of being employed and the labor supply decisions. This
specication includes individual-level variables, household-level variables, the employ-
ment status of the closest relative, and regional dummies to capture any unobservable
region-specic eects.12 To explore whether the results are robust to the inclusion of
additional family attributes that might be correlated within the household, in Speci-
cation 2 I add an additional set of employment attributes of the closest relative such as
position, sector, rm size, and a white collar dummy.
The results, depicted in Table 4, suggest that there might a be confounding in
uence
of the unobserved variables after conditioning on all observed attributes. This implies
the violation of the CIA and, therefore, IV is called for. In fact, when this method is
used, the predicted eect of informal referral is considerably lower than that predicted
by OLS and PSM (see the last column). Moreover, the standard errors tend to increase,
resulting in the failure to reject the null that informal referrals have a causal eect on
the probability of being employed.
The OLS estimates indicate that referred individuals are about 23 percentage points
more likely to obtain employment than non referred workers, and the coecients do not
vary across specications. This result is supported by propensity-score matching (PSM),
since the average treatment eect on the treated is very close to that obtained by OLS,
with the only dierence that they are less precisely estimated since they present larger
standard errors. Like OLS, the estimates using PSM do not vary across specications,
12 The individual-specic covariates in this regression consist of dummies for male, marital status, race, age groups, and
level of education. The household-specic covariates include dummies for the presence of children in the household,
interactions of those with a male dummy, the presence of individuals older than 65, and a dummy variable that
represents whether the individual lives alone. The employment status of the closest relative is comprised of two binary
variables that describe whether he is employed or inactive.
15suggesting that the use of informal referrals is not correlated with the employment
attributes of the closest relative.13
Table 4: Eects of Informal Referrals on Employment, LSS 2003.
OLS PSM 2SLS








[R-SE] [R-SE] [BS-SE] [BS-SE] [R-SE] [R-SE]

0 0.232 0.229 0.235 0.233 0.26 0.051
[0.006]*** [0.006]*** [0.007]*** [0.007]*** [0.082]*** [0.083]
Constant 0.412 0.418 0.647a 0.649a 0.393 0.422
[0.020]*** [0.020]*** [0.057]*** [0.058]***
Control Variables X1 X2 X1 X2 X1 X2
R2 0.149 0.152 0.147 0.106
N 18049 18049 11189b 11194b 18049 18049
Matchedc 99.99% 99.99%
Hausman -testd 0.123 4.938
Hausman -test p-value 0.726 0.026
Weak Ident Teste 91.34 89.655
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
X1 = [ Male, White, Single, Age, Educ, Region, Household Variables, CR employment status ]
X2 = [ Male, White, Single, Age, Educ, Region, Household Variables, CR employment status, CR employment attributes ]
NOTE: The table reports coecients of probability of employment. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. For each specication the
rst column shows the results from OLS, the second from propensity-score matching, and the third from two stage least squares. For
results including the entire set of covariates refer to Appendix D Table 9. a. 722 individuals excluded from the analysis for non response,
b. Treated Individuals, c. Percent of treated with at least one identical match in the control group, d. the endogeneity test is a C or
distance GMM test, it produces a Hausman test that is robust to violations of homoskedasticity, e. Weak identication test reports the
Wald F test robust to violations of homoskedasticity.
A simple way to examine the extent to which \selection on unobservables" may bias
these results is to compare them with those from IV (last two columns).14 The rst
specication does not include measures of employment attributes of the closest rela-
tive other than his employment status, and despite the fact that the eect seems to
be slightly larger than the OLS estimates, we cannot reject the hypothesis that both
coecients dier by using a Hausman test robust to violations of homoskedasticity.
As mentioned in Section 4, it is very likely that the exclusion of employment attributes
of the closest relative might be biasing this result since plausible correlation between
the instrument and the individual employment status might arise. Indeed, when this
information is accounted for in the second specication, the predicted eect of IR be-
comes considerably lower and less precise. Under this specication we can reject the
hypothesis that the OLS and IV coecients dier, moreover, the instrument is not
13 Results of the imbalance covariate test (excluded here) show that the sample dierences in the original data signicantly
exceed those in the sample of matched cases. Therefore, PSM creates a high degree of covariance between treatment
and control samples. Additionally, the are no problems related with the common support assumption since almost all
observations were matched.
14 Recall that the variable used to instrument for IR is the same across specications: a binary variable equal to one if
the closest relative in the household found his current job by informal referrals. The use of informal referrals diers
signicantly if the closest blood relative also used this method: out of those whose closest relative used IR to obtain
his current job, 71.51 percent declares the use of IR, as opposed to 59.16 percent of those whose closest relative used
formal channels to obtain his current job.
16weak.15 Notice that the exclusion restriction only holds when we control for household
attributes; hence, the results support that using informal referrals as the main method
to seek for a job does not improve the probability of being employed compared to any
other job search strategy.
Table 5: Eects of Informal Referrals on Employment,
Interaction Eects, LSS 2003 Specication 2
beta Di

























Higher educ non university -0.103 -0.310
[0.188] [0.202]










No of Observations 18049
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
NOTE: The table reports coecients on the probability of employ-
ment. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Column (1) reports
the estimated eect of each category evaluated at the reference value
of all the other variables. Column (2) reports the dierence between
each category and the reference category. See Appendix D Table 10
for the entire set of covariates
There might be, however, dierential ef-
fects by relevant observed attributes and,
therefore, I test whether the use of infor-
mal referrals aects particular subgroups
more than others. I use the method-
ology described in Wooldridge (2003),
which amounts to allowing the IR eect
to vary according to relevant individual
attributes (i.e. gender, race, age, and ed-
ucation) while controlling for selectivity
bias; for methodological details refer to
Appendix B.
The results, depicted in Table 5, show
signicant dierences between employ-
ment rates of referred and non referred
workers according to gender, age, and
level of education. Referred males have
a higher probability of being employed
than their female counterparts. Age
related dierences are also noticeable,
since referred workers aged between 15
and 24 have a higher probability of be-
ing employed when using informal refer-
rals than any other age group. Finally,
referred workers with either university of postgraduate studies have a lower probability
of being employed than individuals holding at most a primary school degree.
A possible reason for these results is the tendency for vacancies in the informal sector
to be lled by informal referrals. The ideal scenario to test this assertion requires the
15 Notice that the proposed instrument aects a specic population, i.e., those individuals whose closest relative is
employed. Thus, to avoid extrapolation I carry out the same analysis for this sub-sample. Results for both OLS and
PSM tend to be slightly larger since the eect accounts for 26 percentage points, which might re
ect a selection eect.
The results from 2SLS conrm the predictions described here: the inclusion of employment attributes of the closest
member lowers the point estimates and it is no longer signicant. These results are available upon request.
17knowledge of the sector in which unemployed workers are seeking for jobs. Lacking
this information, we can focus on employed workers to explore the data. Indeed, the
gures from this sample conrm that proneness: 88 percent of informal-sector workers
declare they have obtained their job through informal referrals, from which 63 percent
are males, 42 percent are young individuals, and 28 percent are low educated (compared
to 3 percent that has higher education).
Numerous papers have analyzed the empirical eect of using informal referrals on la-
bor outcomes and have concluded that referred individuals are more likely to nd a
job than their non referred counterparts. Instead of showing a causal eect, this re-
sult might only re
ect a correlation that arises from the high reliance on this method
by both potential employers and employees. Indeed, using specic data and method-
ologies, my results suggest that the dierence between employment rates for referred
and non referred workers might simply be an artifact of selection bias, since when I
control for unobserved confounding variables the eect vanishes. Moreover, the results
also indicate the presence of heterogeneous eects, which are very likely to arise from
employer characteristics that determine the context in which job search methods oper-
ate. Specically, for a country like Colombia where the labor market is segmented into
formal and informal sectors, and the later is more likely to rely on informal referrals,
the fact that male, young, and low educated individuals present a higher probability of
being employed if referred re
ects that they are more likely to be hired in the informal
sector and not by the usage of friends and relatives to seek for a job.
Wages. The second outcome of interest is the hourly wage, which is the monthly
remuneration in the primary employment divided by the number of working hours.
The \treatment" variable, IRi, diers from that used in the employment case in the
sense that now it is equal to one only for those who obtained their job through IR.
To explore the robustness of the point estimates, I compare the results from two main
specications that dier on the set of included covariates. Specication 1 includes
individual-specic covariates: male dummy, race dummy, age group dummies, attained
educational level, and regional dummies. It also includes a binary variable representing
whether the individual lives alone, and another one representing the employment status
of the closest relative in the household. As for employment, Specication 2 augments
Specication 1 to include an additional set of employment attributes of the closest
relative.
Unlike employment equation estimates, the results from the wage equation do not sug-
gest that, conditional on the observed covariates, the process by which workers use
18informal referrals is related to unmeasured variables that aect hourly wages. This
conclusion arises from the impossibility of rejecting a dierence between the OLS and
the 2SLS estimators. The main implication of this result is that employers set wages
only on the basis of productive individual attributes like schooling, age, gender, and
race. Thus, after controlling for all these observed covariates, there are no unobserved
individual attributes, such as communicative skills, that might modify the wage setting
between referred and non-referred workers.
Table 6: Eects of Informal Referrals on Hourly Wages (log), LSS 2003.
OLS PSM 2SLS








[CL-SE] [CL-SE] [BS-SE] [BS-SE] [CL-SE] [CL-SE]

0 -0.134 -0.131 -0.155 -0.153 -0.138 -0.124
[0.012]*** [0.012]*** [0.016]*** [0.017]*** [0.156] [0.098]
Constant 7.304 7.271 7.847a 7.693a 7.307 7.265
[0.033]*** [0.034]*** [0.116]*** [0.076]***
Control Variables X1 X2 X1 X2 X1 X2
R2 0.511 0.519 0.511 0.519
N 11468 11468 7771b 7758b 11468 11468
Matchedc 100% 99.98%
Hausman Testd 0.001 0.005
Hausman Test p-value 0.977 0.943
Weak Ident. Teste 53.73 85.47
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
X1 = [ Male, White, Age, Education, Region, CR employment status ]
X2 = [ Male, White, Age, Education, Region, CR employment status, CR employment attributes ]
NOTE: The table reports the coecients of hourly wages in logarithms. Clustered standard errors are in parenthesis for OLS and IV,
the clustering in this case was done by household. Bootstrapped standard errors for propensity-score matching. The rst column shows
the results from OLS, the second from propensity-score matching, and the third from two stage least squares. For results including the
entire set of covariates refer to Appendix D Table 11. a. Upper and lower 1 percent of the hourly wage distribution were excluded to
avoid outliers, b. treated individuals, c. percent of treated with at least one identical match in the control group, d. the endogeneity test
is a C or distance GMM test, it is robust to violations of homoskedasticity, e. Weak identication test reports the Wald F test robust to
violations of homoskedasticity
Indeed, Table 6 shows that including measures of \productive" individual attributes
considerably aects the observed wage gap between referred and non referred workers;
recall from Section 3 that it accounts for about 43 percent less. Yet, when all the deter-
minants of hourly wages are accounted for, the estimation becomes less negative. OLS
results show that referred individuals earn 13 percent lower hourly wages on average,
and this result is robust across specications. Additionally, the point estimates from the
propensity-score method conrm this conclusion.16 Note however that the estimates of
the ATT through PSM tend to be slightly more negative than those obtained through
OLS, which might suggest the presence of heterogeneous eects.17 The last two columns
16 The results of the imbalance covariate test (excluded here) show that the sample dierences in the original data
signicantly exceed those in the sample of matched cases, which creates a high degree of covariance between treatment
and control samples. Additionally, the common support requirement was enforced, and the empirical estimation of the
ATT ensured the existence of potential matches in the non users group for almost all IR users.
17 Table 12 (Appendix D) shows the interaction eects between the use of informal referrals and main individual attributes.
There are no dierences by gender nor race. There are, however, dierences by age and education. By age, it is evident
that referred workers aged between 54 and 65 earn on average 10 percent less than those aged between 15 and 25.
In the case of education we observe signicant dierences for low educated referred workers, particularly for referred
workers with secondary education, and those that have some higher education but do not have a diploma.
19show the 2SLS point estimates; as mentioned before, they do not dier from the OLS
estimates even when controlling for the employment attributes of the closest relative.
Moreover, the 2SLS estimates are less precise than those from OLS and PSM, as the
standard errors rise considerably.
Table 7: Eects of Informal Referrals on Hourly Wages
(log), Sample Selection, Two-Stage Heckman, LSS
2003.
Heckman 2 Stage
Spec 1 Spec 2












Control Variables X1 X2
2 13376 13810
N 18049 18049
NOTE: The table reports the coecients of hourly wages in loga-
rithms from a two-stage Heckman procedure. Here I only show the
results the wage equation, for the results including the selection equa-
tion and other covariates refer to Appendix D table 13. The exclu-
sion restrictions for this method are those variables that can aect
the probability of being employed but not aect directly wages, I se-
lect those included in the employment equation: household variables
(presence of children and elderly), number of employed individuals
within the household, and whether the closest-relative used help from
friends or relatives to obtain his actual job.
These estimates were carried out from a
sub-sample of working individuals with-
out any controls for self-selection into
employment. This sub-sample contains
63 percent of the labor force sample and,
as it is well known, estimates derived
from self-selected samples may be bi-
ased due to correlations between the in-
dependent variables and the stochastic
disturbance induced by the sample selec-
tion rule. I develop a two-step Heckman
model in order to test whether this pro-
cess is biasing the results, using the num-
ber of employed individuals in the house-
hold and the presence of children and
elderly as exclusion restrictions. In Ta-
ble 7, I report the estimates of the wage
equation under dierent controls for self-
selection into the labor force. Two fea-
tures are noteworthy form these results. First, the inverse mills ratio is not signicant
in any specication. Second, a comparison with the results depicted in Table 6 does
not suggest important dierences between the point estimates. Thus, we can say with
condence that there is no evidence of self-selection biases in any of these two speci-
cations.
In sum, the results suggest there is no bias due to selection on unobservables nor
sample-selection. Moreover, once we control for all relevant individual attributes, the
result indicates that referred workers earn 13 percent less than non referred workers on
average. From the theoretical literature we could argue that this result arises from the
fact that informal referrals create poor matches: the availability of informal referrals
and the opportunity to nd a job more easily may induce a job seeker to accept a
job oer in professions, sectors, or locations where his abilities are not fully exploited.
Such a theory postulates a negative relationship between the use of informal referrals
20and wages because job seekers are willing to sacrice higher wages to obtain a position
rapidly. Therefore, using informal referrals may produce a mismatch between worker's
comparative advantage and his occupational choices (Bentolila et al. 2004). However,
this conclusion can be premature since the informal referrals dummy might be proxying
for unobserved job attributes. For instance, informal sector vacancies are normally
lled through informal referrals, and workers in this sector are more likely to earn
less than workers in the formal sector on average. Given the endogeneity of individual
employment attributes and wages, we cannot directly include these variables in the wage
equation and, therefore, IR's coecient might re
ect the correlation between working
in the informal sector and wages.
Thus, it is necessary to explore whether the IR eect diers between informal and
formal sector workers. Here, I dene informal sector workers as employees of small-
size rms (i.e., less than 50 employees) without a signed contract nor social security
benets. Kugler (2003) is the only paper, to my knowledge, that tries to include a wage
dierential across sectors between referred and non referred workers. Unfortunately,
a shortcoming of her paper is that it attempts to estimate wage dierentials by using
one or more dummy variables to indicate the sector where the individual is employed.
However, if the labor market is segmented into formal and informal sectors, and one
of them is more likely to hire workers through informal referrals, there might exist
wage dierentials across sectors that are not solved by including sector dummies or
interaction eects. Moreover, ignoring the endogeneity of being in one sector or the
other may bias the estimates that are based on sector-specic samples.
I propose to employ a model similar to the one commonly used to study union/non-union
wage dierentials (see Lee 1978, and Robinson & Tomes 1984), and public/private wage
dierentials (see Adamchik & Bedi 2000, Tansel 2005, and Van der Gaag & Vijverberg
1988). This model is known as the Roy model, or switching regression model. It consists
of two wage equations and a \switching" equation that determines the sector in which
the employee works (see Appendix C for a detailed description of the methodology).
The wage equations include the same set of covariates used for the total sample; the
switching equation (the probability of obtaining an informal-sector job) depends on the
use of informal referrals IR, on individual attributes that are used by the employer
to choose a worker (age, level of education, gender, race), the employment status of
the closest relative, and, in Specication 2, the employment attributes of the closest
relative.
21In order to identify the parameters of the wage equation, we must impose the restriction
that there is at least one regressor that directly aects preference for sector of employ-
ment but does not directly enter the wage equation (exclusion restriction). Here, I
assume that the number of informal workers in the household, the presence of both
children and elderly, and the informal referrals usage, directly aect the preferences of
being employed in a given sector, but do not directly enter the wage equation. The
motivation for using these exclusion restrictions is that individuals might use this in-
formation to decide in which sector to work and this information will only aect wages
through the selection of the sector. For instance, the number of informal-sector workers
in the household is a proxy variable for unobserved attributes that might be correlated
at the household level. The presence of children and elderly is likely to in
uence the
reservation wage, but unlikely to in
uence the gross oered wage and hence should only
be included in the selection equation (Puhani, 2000).18 In order to control for hetero-
geneous eects of the presence of children in the household by gender, I also include
interaction terms of the presence of children with a dummy for males.
Table 8. Eect of Using Informal Referrals on Hourly Wages (log), Roy model, LSS 2003.
FILM Heckman 2 Stage
Wage Eq. Wage Eq. Sel Eq. Wage Eq. Wage Eq. Sel Eq.
Formal Informal Formal Informal
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Informal Referrals -0.131 -0.076 0.668 -0.143 -0.077 0.689
[0.013]*** [0.155] [0.036]*** [0.021]*** [0.126] [0.037]***
Constant 7.261 7.115 -0.933 7.221 6.863 -0.573
[0.035]*** [0.439]*** [0.088]*** [0.060]*** [0.291]*** [0.095]***









* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
X1 = [ Male, White, Age, Education, Region, CR employment status ]
X3 = [ Male, White, Age, Education, Region, CR employment status, Exclusion Restrictions ]
NOTE: The table reports the coecients of hourly wages in logarithms. The rst three columns reports the results from a Full Information
Maximum Likelihood, whereas, the last three columns show the results from the Heckman two stage methodology. For methodological
description refer to Appendix C. The results for the selection equation show the coecients from a probit model of the probability of
being employed in the informal sector, they are coecients and not marginal eects. a. 0 is the correlation coecient between the error
term of the informal-sector wage equation, 1i, and the error term from the switching equation, ui. b. 1 is the correlation coecient
between the error term of the formal-sector wage equation, 2i, and the error term from the switching equation, ui. See Appendix D
Table 14, for the results with the entire set of covariates.
Table 8 shows the results obtained by two main estimation methods: FILM and Heck-
man two stages; refer to Appendix C for methodological details. For each method I
present the three equations: the rst two columns show the wage equations for each
sector, and the third presents the results for the selection equation (i.e., the probability
of working in the informal sector).
18 Usual criticisms associated with these variables, such as household attributes having an impact on the tax rate, inducing
a correlation between children and the after-tax wage, do not apply in this case because I am analyzing before-tax
wages.
22From the selection equation, it is evident that the use of informal referrals increases
the likelihood of being employed in the informal sector. This result might arise from
a number of reasons. First, informal sector rms are not constrained by labor regula-
tions. Second, informal referrals lower hiring cost and are more likely to operate locally
(Holzer, 1987a; Montgomery, 1991); thus, the informal sector rms are more likely to
use informal referrals intensively than formal sector rms, not only because this might
reduce cost but also because informal rms have better knowledge of the local network.
Notice that although workers using informal referrals might have better chances of
obtaining a position in informal sector rms, there is no signicant wage gap between
referred and non referred workers. On the contrary, referred workers in formal-sector
rms earn 13 percent less on average than non referred workers. This result might
arise from the fact that jobs found through informal referrals in this specic sector
are obtained more quickly but also pay lower wages, since at least some of them are
lled by workers who sacrice their productivity advantage in order to get a job more
easily. This result is very important for the analysis of the eect of job search strategies
on wages, since it conrms the mismatch theory between workers' productivity and
occupational choices proposed by Bentolila et al. (2004). However, it is important to
highlight that this is only true for formal-sector positions.
6. Conclusion
Theory predicts that job information networks play a relevant role on the 
ows of in-
formation between job seekers and potential employers. The reduction of informational
asymmetries might facilitate employment, since individuals who use informal referrals
to seek employment receive and accept more job oers than workers who use other
methods. However, job seekers { at least partly { decide whether to use this method,
and this determination may be correlated with both observed and unobserved char-
acteristics which might also aect the probability of being employed. Moreover, both
job seekers and potential employers might rely strongly on contacts to either nd a job
or ll vacancies, and this reliance arises from the institutional background instead of
plausible amelioration of information 
ows between the two parties. Therefore, when
drawing conclusions about causal eects of the use of informal referrals on employment
one must take into account the possible confounding in
uence of other variables.
To explore for the presence of confounding in
uence of other variables I compare the
average treatment eect on the employment status for those who use informal referrals
as their main method to search for a job with those that use other \formal" methods.
23In order to do this I use three main methodologies: ordinary least squares, propensity-
score matching and instrumental variables. The rst two assume that the confounding
in
uence of other variables arises from those variables that we can observe in the data
(individual and household specic attributes). When controlling for these attributes,
either by OLS or PSM, the results suggest that the use of informal referrals increases
the probability of being employed by 23 percentage points. There could exist, however,
unobserved variables aecting this result such as communicative skills or institutional
background. To test for their presence I carried out a two stage least squares estimation
using the use of informal referrals from the closest relative in the household, conditional
on the employment attributes of the closest relative, as an instrument. The results
suggest that much of the positive eect stems from the confounding variables; I argue
that the positive eect re
ects the prevalence of informal-sector jobs to be lled through
this method rather than a causal eect. Specically, the presence of heterogeneous
eects for those workers that are more likely to be hired in informal-sector jobs (males,
young, and low educated) conrms this argument.
Several studies have evaluated whether the job positions acquired by informal channels
lead to a dierential in wages between referred and non referred workers. It is well
known that existing theoretical and empirical literature has produced con
icting results.
To explore how job information networks might aect the wage setting process in the
Colombian labor market, I compare the results from OLS, PSM and IV. In this case, the
results do not support the hypothesis of presence of unobserved confounding variables;
on the contrary, they support the hypothesis that, conditional on observed individual
attributes, referred and non referred workers become comparable.
The point estimates suggest that referred workers earn 13 percent less than non referred
workers on average. Notice, however, that this result might be biased if either workers
sort themselves into sectors, or if a worker's contacts have a positive impact on the
probability of obtaining a job in, say, the informal sector, and this is correlated with
the wage obtained in that sector. Given the endogeneity of employment attributes and
wages, I use a Roy model to account for plausible wage dierentials between informal
and formal sectors. The\returns"to informal referrals are statistically dierent in both
sectors: in the formal sector, referred workers earn less than non referred workers on
average, while no dierence is observed in the informal sector. Thus, we can conclude
that informal referrals create low/poor-quality matches only in formal sector positions,
since the availability of informal referrals and the opportunity to nd a job more easily
may induce a job seeker to accept positions in occupations where his abilities are not
fully exploited.
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26Appendix A. Data Description
The Living Standards Survey (LSS) provides measures of the socioeconomic status of the Colombian population.
In particular, it provides information on school enrolment rates, housing conditions, access to amenities and
facilities, income and expenditures, unemployment rates, health indicators, and child care among others. The
LSS is representative at the regional level (ve regions and four main departments: Atlantic, Eastern, Central,
Pacic, Orinoquia, Antioquia, Valle del Cauca, San Andres and Bogota).
Sampling methodology: The sample for the LSS survey is taken from the universe of the census population. The
sampling methodology consist of rst generating strata according to geographical location and socioeconomic
level; then randomly drawing municipalities from these strata; next, randomly drawing neighborhoods from
these municipalities; and nally, randomly drawing blocks and then households from these neighborhoods. To
facilitate the collection of information, households are grouped into segments of ten households on average.




Persons who during the reference period stated one of the following categories: i. are
seeking for a job through friends or relatives (unemployed), ii. obtained their current
job trough friends or relatives (employed).
Employment
Persons between 15 and 65 years old who during the reference period were in one of the
following categories: i: persons who worked for at least one hour for remuneration
during the last week, ii: persons who did not work during the reference week but
had a job.
Monthly Wages Wages are composed of remuneration in cash in the primary and secondary job.
Hourly Wages The monthly wage divided by the monthly working hours.
Age Groups
Set of dummy variables: less than 15, 15-24, 25-45, 45-64, 65 and more (the reference
age group is 15-24).
Level of
Education
Refers to the highest level of attained education. It is measured with a set of dummy
variables, one for each educational level, which in each case equal 1 if the person was
in one of the following categories: i: Primary or Less: 0 to 5 years of education.
ii: Secondary: 6 to 11 years of education. iii:Non-university higher education:
bachelors degree of three years iv: University: bachelors degree of ve years. This
also includes postgraduate education.
White
Describes the ethnic group of each member of the household. It is a dummy variable
equal to 1 if the individual declares himself as white.
Marital Status
Describes the marital status of each member of the household in the moment of the
survey. In the analysis a dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual is single was
included.
Region
Refers to the geographic area where the household is located. Set of dummy vari-
ables: Atlantico, Central, Pacic, Eastern, Orinoquia- Amazonia, Antioquia, Valle
del Cauca, San Andres, and Bogota (reference group).
Closest Blood
Relative (CR)
It is a variable that indicates the closest person to each individual within the house-
hold. For example, for ospring the closest member might be the father or mother;
in their absence, the closest blood relative can be selected among the stepfather or
stepmother, the grandfather or grandmother, a sibling, uncle, cousin, and so forth. It
has to respect this order. However, for the head of the household who is married or
cohabiting this variable takes the information of his or her partner. For uni-personal
households this variable takes the value of zero
CR Employed It is a binary variable equal to 1 if the closest blood relative is employed.
CR employed by
IR
It is a binary variable equal to 1 if the closest blood-relative is employed and found
his current job through the help of friends or relatives.
CR employment
attributes
They are a set of variables that describe the employment attributes of the closest
relative.
27Appendix B. Interaction Effects
Wooldridge (2003) shows that standard instrumental variable estimators, applied to an equation containing
interactions, consistently estimate the average treatment eect. Under some assumptions, we can estimate the
following model in two stages:
y = x + 
IR + x1IR1 + x2IR2 ::: + xgIRg + u
First estimate a linear reduced form for IR by regressing IR on (1;x;z) and obtaining the tted values, say ^ IR.
Valid IVs for observation i are then (1;xi; ^ IRi;x1i ^ IRi;x2i ^ IRi;:::;xgi ^ IRi). Mechanically, one would specify the
variables from the previous equation and list as IVs those in brackets. The interpretation of the coecients,
however, is not straightforward. Say we want to test if the use of informal referrals is associated with an
increase in the probability of being employed when condition xj is met. The marginal eect of using informal
referrals, evaluated at the reference value of all other variables, is given by @yi=@ ^ IR = 
 +1xj for j = 1;2;:::;g.
From here we see that 
 only captures the eect of IR on employment when all conditioning variables are set
to zero, i.e. x1 = x2 =  = xw = 0. Similarly, the coecient j only captures the eect of each variable on
employment for non IR users, i.e. IR = 0. Thus, it is incorrect to say that a positive and signicant coecient
on IR (or xj) indicates that a variation in IR (or xj) is expected to lead to an increase in the probability
of employment. Moreover, the eect of using informal referrals on employment depends on the values of the
conditioning variables. If the conditioning variable is, for example, gender we should present two values: the
marginal eect of IR when x1 is zero and when x1 is one, i.e., 
, and 
 + 1, along with the corresponding




jvar( ^ j) + 2xjcov(^ 
; ^ j). We can also
estimate the average treatment eect on the treated as: ATT =
PN
i=1(^ 
 +xi1^ 1 +xi2^ 2 +:::+xig^ g), and clearly










These are the results depicted in Table 5.
Appendix C. The Roy Model
Let us assume that a criterion function Ii determines in which sector the agent is employed. Ii = 1 if worker i
is employed in the informal sector, and Ii = 0 if he is employed in the formal sector:
Ii = 1 if 
Zi + ui > 0
Ii = 0 if 
Zi + ui  0
Now, we can assume that hourly wages in each sector are determined as follows:
ln(w1i) = 1X1i + 1i if Ii = 1
ln(w2i) = 2X2i + 2i if Ii = 0
Where wji is the hourly wage and Xji is a vector of wage determining variables (e.g. gender, race, age, and
level of education). Assuming normality of u, 1 and 2, maximum likelihood estimates of the parameter vectors
of interest, 1 and 2, can be obtained. For identication this methodology relies on two assumptions. First,
there is at least one variable that aects the decision to work in a given sector but does not directly hourly
wages. In this set up the variables that seem to satisfy this condition are the following: number of informal
workers in the household, presence of both children and elderly individuals, and a dummy variable if the closest
relative in the household obtained his job by informal referrals. Second, it assumes that u, 1 and 2 have a






















2 are the variances of the
error terms in the wage equations. 21 is the covariance of u1 and 1i and 31 is the covariance of ui and 2i.
The covariance between 1i and 2i is not dened as w1i and w2i are never observed simultaneously. Given the
assumption of the error terms the parameters can be estimated through Full Information Maximum Likelihood
(FILM). It is more common, however, to estimate the model using Heckman's two step method applied to the
truncated means (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005):
E[ln(wi)jXi;Ii = 1] = 1X1 + 21(
Z)
E[ln(wi)jXi;Ii = 1] = 2X2   31( 
Z)
Where (
Z) is the inverse mills ratio, i.e., (
Z) = (
Z)=(
Z). A rst-stage probit estimation of whether
or not worker i works in the informal sector yields an estimate of 
 and hence (
Z). Two separate OLS
regressions then lead to direct estimates of (1;21) and (2;31). In the text I report the estimates from both
the full information maximum likelihood and the Heckman two step method applied to truncated means.
28Appendix D. Tables
Table 9. Eect of using informal referrals on the probability of being employed, OLS and 2SLS, LSS 2003
SPECIFICATION 1 SPECIFICATION 2
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Empl. Eq Empl. Eq IR Eq. Empl. Eq Empl. Eq IR Eq.
Constant 0.412 0.393 0.655 0.418 0.535 0.65
[0.020]*** [0.057]*** [0.023]*** [0.020]*** [0.058]*** [0.023]***
Informal Referrals 0.232 0.26 0.23 0.051
[0.006]*** [0.082]*** [0.006]*** [0.083]
Individual Variables
Male dummy 0.029 0.028 0.033 0.026 0.032 0.033
[0.007]*** [0.008]*** [0.009]*** [0.007]*** [0.008]*** [0.009]***
White dummy 0.049 0.047 0.044 0.049 0.057 0.044
[0.014]*** [0.014]*** [0.017]*** [0.014]*** [0.014]*** [0.017]***
Single dummy -0.041 -0.041 -0.016 -0.037 -0.04 -0.017
[0.007]*** [0.008]*** [0.009]* [0.007]*** [0.008]*** [0.010]*
Age 25-34 0.143 0.142 0.023 0.144 0.148 0.024
[0.009]*** [0.009]*** [0.010]** [0.009]*** [0.009]*** [0.010]**
Age 35-44 0.151 0.149 0.064 0.152 0.163 0.066
[0.010]*** [0.011]*** [0.012]*** [0.010]*** [0.011]*** [0.012]***
Age 45-54 0.139 0.138 0.044 0.14 0.149 0.048
[0.011]*** [0.012]*** [0.014]*** [0.011]*** [0.012]*** [0.014]***
Age 55-64 0.087 0.086 0.041 0.088 0.095 0.044
[0.017]*** [0.017]*** [0.020]** [0.017]*** [0.017]*** [0.020]**
Secondary 0.053 0.056 -0.092 0.056 0.041 -0.088
[0.009]*** [0.012]*** [0.010]*** [0.009]*** [0.012]*** [0.010]***
High educ non university 0.122 0.127 -0.189 0.128 0.096 -0.179
[0.011]*** [0.019]*** [0.014]*** [0.011]*** [0.019]*** [0.014]***
Unnished university 0.106 0.112 -0.186 0.117 0.086 -0.171
[0.012]*** [0.020]*** [0.015]*** [0.012]*** [0.019]*** [0.015]***
University 0.163 0.17 -0.242 0.175 0.134 -0.226
[0.011]*** [0.023]*** [0.014]*** [0.011]*** [0.022]*** [0.014]***
Post University 0.239 0.249 -0.359 0.254 0.192 -0.336
[0.011]*** [0.032]*** [0.016]*** [0.012]*** [0.031]*** [0.017]***
Household Variables
Child 0 -3 years old -0.044 -0.044 -0.012 -0.044 -0.046 -0.008
[0.014]*** [0.014]*** [0.016] [0.014]*** [0.014]*** [0.016]
Child 4 -6 years old -0.003 -0.003 0.016 -0.002 0.001 0.018
[0.013] [0.013] [0.016] [0.013] [0.013] [0.016]
Child 6 - 12 years old -0.023 -0.023 -0.003 -0.022 -0.022 -0.002
[0.010]** [0.010]** [0.012] [0.010]** [0.010]** [0.012]
Child 0 -3 years old x Male 0.101 0.1 0.042 0.097 0.103 0.038
[0.016]*** [0.016]*** [0.021]** [0.016]*** [0.017]*** [0.021]*
Child 4 -6 years old x Male 0.048 0.049 -0.03 0.044 0.039 -0.034
[0.016]*** [0.016]*** [0.021] [0.016]*** [0.016]** [0.021]
Child 6 -12 years old x Male 0.04 0.04 0.017 0.038 0.04 0.015
[0.013]*** [0.013]*** [0.016] [0.013]*** [0.013]*** [0.016]
Presence old individual -0.021 -0.021 0.003 -0.018 -0.018 0.001
[0.010]** [0.010]** [0.012] [0.010]* [0.010]* [0.012]
Closest Relative (CR) Variables
CR Type of employment
Self-employed -0.033 -0.041 0.024
[0.009]*** [0.010]*** [0.013]*
CR Sector
Public Sector -0.04 -0.063 -0.101
[0.015]*** [0.019]*** [0.020]***
CR Firm Size
Medium size 0.001 -0.003 -0.027
[0.013] [0.013] [0.017]
Large Size 0.011 0.005 -0.035
[0.011] [0.012] [0.015]**
CR other
White Collar employee 0.011 0.013 0.018
[0.009] [0.009] [0.010]*
CR earnings (logs) -0.018 -0.019 -0.006
[0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.005]
CR employed 0.001 0.001 -0.023 0.027 0.035 -0.029
[0.006] [0.006] [0.009]*** [0.011]** [0.012]*** [0.015]*
CR inactive 0.057 0.056 0.036 0.042 0.047 0.028
[0.012]*** [0.013]*** [0.018]** [0.013]*** [0.013]*** [0.019]
Unipersonal Household 0.029 0.029 -0.008 0.017 0.015 -0.013
[0.015]* [0.015]** [0.019] [0.015] [0.015] [0.019]
Excluded Instrument
CR employed by IR 0.092 0.114
[0.010]*** [0.012]***
Other Controls
Region dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
R-squared 0.148 0.147 0.054 0.15 0.106 0.058
N 18049 18049 18049 18049 18049 18049
Endogeneity test 0.123 4.938
Endogeneity p-value 0.726 0.026
Weak instruments Test 91.34 89.655
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
29Table 10. Eect of using informal referrals on the probability of being employed, Interaction Eects, LSS 2003
SPECIFICATION 1 SPECIFICATION 2
IV + Interactions IV + Interactions
Emp. Eq IR x Var Emp. Eq IR x Var
Constant 0.181 0.422
[0.165] [0.153]***
Informal Referrals 0.535 0.207
[0.236]** [0.220]
Individual Variables
Male dummy -0.089 0.195 -0.076 0.18
[0.034]*** [0.055]*** [0.031]** [0.051]***
White dummy -0.021 0.106 -0.007 0.1
[0.063] [0.103] [0.061] [0.100]
Single dummy -0.041 -0.039
[0.008]*** [0.008]***
Age 25-34 0.243 -0.168 0.249 -0.172
[0.058]*** [0.094]* [0.055]*** [0.089]*
Age 35-44 0.284 -0.217 0.314 -0.245
[0.061]*** [0.097]** [0.057]*** [0.091]***
Age 45-54 0.31 -0.276 0.347 -0.321
[0.062]*** [0.100]*** [0.059]*** [0.094]***
Age 55-64 0.382 -0.465 0.39 -0.467
[0.079]*** [0.127]*** [0.078]*** [0.123]***
Attained Education
Secondary 0.186 -0.153 0.033 0.029
[0.133] [0.174] [0.123] [0.161]
High educ non university 0.423 -0.419 0.299 -0.31
[0.158]*** [0.230]* [0.141]** [0.202]
Unnished university 0.588 -0.738 0.299 -0.322
[0.165]*** [0.245]*** [0.147]** [0.214]
University 0.457 -0.422 0.351 -0.359
[0.148]*** [0.213]** [0.133]*** [0.188]*
Post University 0.683 -0.842 0.504 -0.676
[0.150]*** [0.239]*** [0.132]*** [0.200]***
Household Variables
Child 0 -3 years old -0.043 -0.045
[0.014]*** [0.014]***
Child 4 -6 years old 0.001 0.003
[0.014] [0.014]
Child 6 - 12 years old -0.021 -0.02
[0.011]** [0.011]*
Child 0 -3 years old x Male 0.092 0.095
[0.017]*** [0.017]***
Child 4 -6 years old x Male 0.045 0.035
[0.016]*** [0.017]**
Child 6 -12 years old x Male 0.032 0.033
[0.013]** [0.013]**
Presence old individual -0.022 -0.019
[0.010]** [0.010]*
Closest Relative (CR) Variables












White Collar employee 0.012
[0.009]
CR earnings (logs) -0.02
[0.004]***
CR employed 0.001 0.034
[0.007] [0.012]***
CR inactive 0.059 0.05
[0.013]*** [0.013]***
Unipersonal Household 0.032 0.016
[0.015]** [0.015]
Other Controls
Region Dummies YES YES
R-squared 0.076 0.08
N 18049 18049
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
30Table 11. Eect of using informal referrals on hourly wages, OLS and 2SLS, LSS 2003
SPECIFICATION 1 SPECIFICATION 2
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Wage. Eq Wage. Eq IR Eq. Wage. Eq Wage. Eq IR Eq.
Constant 7.304 7.307 0.714 7.27 7.265 0.708
[0.034]*** [0.116]*** [0.026]*** [0.034]*** [0.076]*** [0.026]***
Informal Referrals -0.134 -0.138 -0.131 -0.124
[0.012]*** [0.156] [0.012]*** [0.098]
Individual Variables
Male dummy 0.129 0.129 0.024 0.139 0.138 0.026
[0.011]*** [0.011]*** [0.009]*** [0.011]*** [0.011]*** [0.009]***
White dummy -0.016 -0.015 0.036 -0.015 -0.015 0.033
[0.027] [0.028] [0.022] [0.027] [0.027] [0.021]
Age 25-34 0.281 0.28 -0.042 0.277 0.277 -0.038
[0.015]*** [0.017]*** [0.012]*** [0.015]*** [0.016]*** [0.012]***
Age 35-44 0.408 0.407 -0.021 0.405 0.405 -0.017
[0.016]*** [0.017]*** [0.013] [0.016]*** [0.016]*** [0.013]
Age 45-54 0.559 0.559 -0.031 0.555 0.555 -0.024
[0.020]*** [0.020]*** [0.015]** [0.020]*** [0.020]*** [0.015]
Age 55-64 0.56 0.56 -0.034 0.556 0.556 -0.029
[0.033]*** [0.034]*** [0.023] [0.033]*** [0.033]*** [0.023]
Attained Education
Secondary -0.338 -0.337 0.081 -0.32 -0.32 0.078
[0.016]*** [0.020]*** [0.012]*** [0.016]*** [0.017]*** [0.012]***
High educ non university 0.397 0.397 -0.123 0.37 0.371 -0.117
[0.018]*** [0.026]*** [0.015]*** [0.018]*** [0.021]*** [0.015]***
Unnished university 0.513 0.513 -0.125 0.475 0.476 -0.123
[0.019]*** [0.028]*** [0.016]*** [0.019]*** [0.023]*** [0.016]***
University 0.988 0.987 -0.19 0.928 0.929 -0.182
[0.019]*** [0.037]*** [0.015]*** [0.020]*** [0.027]*** [0.015]***
Post University 1.362 1.36 -0.318 1.284 1.287 -0.304
[0.022]*** [0.055]*** [0.019]*** [0.023]*** [0.039]*** [0.019]***
Closest Relative (CR) Variables
CR Type of employment
Self-employed 0.057 0.057 0.148
[0.018]*** [0.018]*** [0.024]***
CR Sector
Public Sector -0.076 -0.075 -0.185
[0.033]** [0.033]** [0.031]***
CR Firm Size
Medium size 0.017 0.017 0.019
[0.025] [0.025] [0.020]
Large Size 0.093 0.093 -0.008
[0.023]*** [0.023]*** [0.019]
CR other
White Collar employee 0.084 0.084 0.01
[0.017]*** [0.017]*** [0.013]
CR earnings (logs) 0.071 0.071 0.004
[0.008]*** [0.008]*** [0.006]
CR employed -0.024 -0.024 -0.016 -0.143 -0.144 0.006
[0.012]** [0.012]** [0.011] [0.020]*** [0.020]*** [0.016]
CR inactive 0.047 0.048 0.02 0.102 0.102 0.02
[0.028]* [0.028]* [0.021] [0.029]*** [0.029]*** [0.022]
Unipersonal Household -0.064 -0.064 -0.036 -0.023 -0.022 -0.032
[0.026]** [0.026]** [0.022] [0.026] [0.026] [0.022]
Excluded Instrument
CR employed by IR 0.099 0.215
[0.013]*** [0.023]***
Other Controls
Region dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
R-squared 0.511 0.511 0.071 0.519 0.519 0.083
N 11468 11468 11468 11468 11468 11468
Endogeneity test 0.001 0.005
Endogeneity p-value 0.977 0.943
Weak instruments Test 53.732 85.437
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
31Table 12. Eect of using informal referrals on hourly wages, interaction eects, LSS 2003
SPECIFICATION 1 SPECIFICATION 2
Interactions Interactions
Wage. Eq IR x Var Wage. Eq IR x Var
Constant 6.897 6.892
[0.062]*** [0.062]***
Informal Referrals -0.141 -0.14
[0.012]*** [0.012]***
Individual Variables
Male dummy 0.137 -0.011 0.144 -0.008
[0.018]*** [0.022] [0.018]*** [0.023]
White dummy 0.002 -0.027 0.001 -0.025
[0.043] [0.054] [0.043] [0.054]
Age 25-34 0.271 0.011 0.264 0.015
[0.028]*** [0.033] [0.028]*** [0.033]
Age 35-44 0.414 -0.012 0.409 -0.01
[0.030]*** [0.036] [0.030]*** [0.035]
Age 45-54 0.553 0.007 0.554 -0.003
[0.034]*** [0.041] [0.034]*** [0.041]
Age 55-64 0.652 -0.132 0.645 -0.129
[0.049]*** [0.065]** [0.050]*** [0.065]**
Attained Education
Secondary 0.393 -0.073 0.375 -0.073
[0.036]*** [0.039]* [0.035]*** [0.039]*
High educ non university 0.773 -0.051 0.731 -0.059
[0.041]*** [0.049] [0.041]*** [0.048]
Unnished university 0.921 -0.101 0.874 -0.116
[0.043]*** [0.051]** [0.042]*** [0.050]**
University 1.338 -0.002 1.266 -0.015
[0.039]*** [0.049] [0.040]*** [0.049]
Post University 1.685 0.069 1.598 0.053
[0.041]*** [0.053] [0.042]*** [0.055]
Closest Relative (CR) Variables












White Collar employee 0.101
[0.029]***
CR earnings (logs) 0.065
[0.012]***
CR employed -0.018 -0.179
[0.020] [0.034]***
CR inactive 0.077 0.132
[0.043]* [0.044]***
Unipersonal Household -0.1 -0.057
[0.043]** [0.043]
Other Controls
Region Dummies YES YES
R-squared 0.512 0.522
N 11468 11468
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
32Table 13. Eect of using informal referrals on hourly wages, Two Stage Heckman, LSS 2003
Specication 1 Specication 2
Wage Eq. Select Eq. Wage Eq. Select Eq.
b/[sd] b/[sd] b/[sd] b/[sd]
Constant 6.904 -0.652 6.923 -0.634
[0.091]*** [0.071]*** [0.090]*** [0.071]***
Informal Referrals -0.1 0.777 -0.11 0.775
[0.029]*** [0.023]*** [0.030]*** [0.023]***
Individual Variables
Male dummy 0.142 0.106 0.146 0.099
[0.014]*** [0.028]*** [0.013]*** [0.028]***
White dummy 0.005 0.162 0.004 0.165
[0.027] [0.052]*** [0.027] [0.052]***
Age 25-34 0.312 0.552 0.298 0.55
[0.026]*** [0.030]*** [0.026]*** [0.030]***
Age 35-44 0.443 0.645 0.43 0.642
[0.029]*** [0.033]*** [0.029]*** [0.034]***
Age 45-54 0.6 0.598 0.589 0.592
[0.029]*** [0.039]*** [0.029]*** [0.039]***
Age 55-64 0.619 0.386 0.611 0.378
[0.033]*** [0.058]*** [0.033]*** [0.058]***
Attained Education
Secondary 0.33 0.212 0.312 0.22
[0.018]*** [0.034]*** [0.018]*** [0.034]***
High educ non university 0.743 0.447 0.695 0.461
[0.026]*** [0.046]*** [0.026]*** [0.046]***
Unnished university 0.874 0.36 0.815 0.384
[0.025]*** [0.046]*** [0.026]*** [0.047]***
University 1.379 0.557 1.299 0.58
[0.027]*** [0.046]*** [0.028]*** [0.048]***
Post University 1.827 0.955 1.726 0.981
[0.036]*** [0.060]*** [0.038]*** [0.062]***
Closest Relative (CR) Variables




Public Sector -0.007 -0.138
[0.030] [0.062]**
CR Firm Size
Medium size 0.016 0.035
[0.026] [0.054]
Large Size 0.075 0.01
[0.022]*** [0.046]
CR other
White Collar employee 0.078 0.059
[0.017]*** [0.032]*
CR earnings (logs) 0.073 -0.039
[0.007]*** [0.014]***
CR employed -0.03 -0.019 -0.209 0.055
[0.012]** [0.030] [0.020]*** [0.049]
CR inactive 0.058 0.214 0.113 0.187
[0.026]** [0.062]*** [0.026]*** [0.063]***
Unipersonal Household -0.047 0.12 -0.007 0.089
[0.028]* [0.057]** [0.028] [0.058]
Excluded Instrument
CR informal 0.029 0.032
[0.012]** [0.013]**
CR employed by IR 0.013 -0.054
[0.031] [0.038]
Children 0 3 -0.066 -0.067
[0.048] [0.048]
Children 4 6 0.062 0.06
[0.049] [0.049]
Children 7 12 -0.05 -0.045
[0.038] [0.038]
Children 0 3 x male 0.368 0.355
[0.068]*** [0.068]***
Children 4 6 x male 0.213 0.204
[0.071]*** [0.071]***
Children 7 12 x male 0.168 0.161
[0.053]*** [0.053]***
Old individuald -0.137 -0.131
[0.036]*** [0.037]***
Ancilliary Parameters
Mills Ratio 0.077 0.038
[0.086] [0.087]
Other Controls
Region dummies YES YES YES YES
Model chi-square 13376.41 13810.817
N 18049 18049
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
33Table 14. Eect of using informal referrals on hourly wages, Switching Regression, LSS 2003
FILM Heckman 2 Stage
Wage Informal Wage Formal Sel. Eq Wage Informal Wage Formal Sel. Eq
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Constant 7.115 7.261 -0.933 6.863 7.22 -0.573
[0.439]*** [0.035]*** [0.088]*** [0.291]*** [0.060]*** [0.095]***
Informal Referrals -0.076 -0.131 0.668 -0.077 -0.143 0.689
[0.155] [0.013]*** [0.036]*** [0.126] [0.021]*** [0.037]***
Individual Variables
Male dummy 0.218 0.106 0.064 0.218 0.111 0.088
[0.025]*** [0.011]*** [0.037]* [0.026]*** [0.011]*** [0.038]**
White dummy -0.058 0.001 0.063 -0.058 0.003 0.049
[0.057] [0.027] [0.068] [0.056] [0.027] [0.069]
Age 25-34 0.273 0.264 -0.418 0.274 0.231 -0.411
[0.088]*** [0.017]*** [0.039]*** [0.071]*** [0.022]*** [0.040]***
Age 35-44 0.306 0.407 -0.517 0.306 0.369 -0.492
[0.112]*** [0.018]*** [0.043]*** [0.086]*** [0.024]*** [0.043]***
Age 45-54 0.363 0.569 -0.788 0.364 0.516 -0.756
[0.176]** [0.021]*** [0.052]*** [0.135]*** [0.031]*** [0.052]***
Age 55-64 0.282 0.614 -0.554 0.282 0.576 -0.525
[0.133]** [0.033]*** [0.080]*** [0.107]*** [0.036]*** [0.080]***
Attained Education
Secondary 0.256 0.348 -0.41 0.256 0.312 -0.405
[0.089]*** [0.020]*** [0.039]*** [0.071]*** [0.024]*** [0.039]***
High educ non university 0.211 0.417 -0.675 0.467 0.686 -1.055
[0.164] [0.018]*** [0.052]*** [0.189]** [0.041]*** [0.060]***
Unnished university 0.323 0.537 -0.635 0.58 0.808 -1.001
[0.153]** [0.020]*** [0.054]*** [0.178]*** [0.042]*** [0.062]***
University 0.587 1.016 -0.897 0.844 1.279 -1.257
[0.230]** [0.018]*** [0.061]*** [0.237]*** [0.043]*** [0.066]***
Post University 1.206 1.373 -1.285 1.464 1.629 -1.689
[0.354]*** [0.022]*** [0.112]*** [0.349]*** [0.047]*** [0.115]***
Closest Relative (CR) Variables
CR employed -0.052 -0.012 0.074 -0.052 -0.005 0.076
[0.033] [0.012] [0.038]** [0.031]* [0.012] [0.039]**
CR inactive -0.112 0.084 0.098 -0.113 0.092 0.152
[0.066]* [0.027]*** [0.077] [0.067]* [0.026]*** [0.077]**
Unipersonal Household -0.028 -0.067 0.202 -0.029 -0.049 0.212
[0.074] [0.029]** [0.071]*** [0.068] [0.029]* [0.072]***
Exclusion Restrictions
Informal Workers HH 0.005 0.019
[0.017] [0.017]
CR employed by IR 0.001 0.003
[0.038] [0.039]
Children 0 3 0.187 0.178
[0.066]*** [0.066]***
Children 4 6 0.147 0.149
[0.064]** [0.064]**
Children 6 12 0.03 0.03
[0.050] [0.053]
Children 0 3 x male -0.139 -0.138
[0.081]* [0.081]*
Children 4 6 x male -0.182 -0.187
[0.080]** [0.081]**
Childrem 6 12 x male -0.021 -0.01
[0.063] [0.066]
Old individuals -0.013 0.002
[0.052] [0.051]
Ancilliary Parameters







Region Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Model chi-square 247.359 264.12 3739.787
N 11468 11468 11468
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
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